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A Proposal for the Reform of
International Tax Law
John McDonald*
In my own case the words of such an act as the Income Tax, for
example, merely dance before my eyes in a meaningless procession
cross-reference to cross-reference, exception upon exception -
couched in abstract terms that offer no handle to seize hold of - leave
in my mind only a confused sense of some vitally important, but suc-
cessfully concealed, purport, which it is my duty to extract, but which is
within my power, if at all, only after the most inordinate expenditure of
time. I know that these monsters are the result of fabulous industry and
ingenuity, plugging up this hole and casting out that net, against all pos-
sible evasion; yet at times I cannot help recalling a saying of William
James about certain passages of Hegel. that they were no doubt written
with a passion of rationality; but that one cannot help wondering
whether to the reader they have any significance save that the words are
strung together with syntactical correctness.
-Learned Hand'
* The author wishes to thank Thomas W. Bottomlee of Baker and McKenzie for his
thoughtful comments.
1 This statement was made by Learned Hand. He was referring to the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939, which could almost be described as simplistic compared to the provisions currently
imposed by the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. James S. Eustice, Tax Complexity and the Tax




Nowhere is the complexity of the Code2 more apparent than in
the income tax provisions relating to U.S. ownership of foreign corpo-
rations.' In fact, the operation of the tax law in this area has become
so incredibly complex that many calculations required by the Code
can no longer be performed effectively without the use of sophisti-
cated computer software.4 The cost of complying with these Code pro-
visions has started to affect the competitiveness of the corporations to
which they apply.5 In fact, there is a definite possibility that our tax
laws in this area have become so complex that tax professionals may
simply not be able to render accurate advice to their clients.6 In order
to determine why this area of the Code is so complex, the nature of
the debate raging over the U.S. system of international taxation must
first be understood.
There are four generally accepted bases of taxation:
" Territorial Based Taxation - all income derived from within the coun-
try's borders is subject to that country's tax.7
" Source Based Taxation - all income which can be sourced to that coun-
try will be taxed by that country.
8
2 Unless otherwise noted, all section references and code references shall be to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 as amended.
3 "Like most parts of the Internal Revenue Code... the portion detailing the taxation of
income from international transactions, has been the subject of almost constant congressional
tinkering in recent years .... These rules were among the most arcane and complex in the Code
at the inception of this process; they are now unparalleled in their intricacy." Julie A. Roin, The
Grand Illusion: A Neutral System for the Taxation of International Transactions, 75 VA. L. REv.
919, 920 (1989).
4 Richard M. Hammer & Wesley N. Riemer, Coping With Separate Foreign Tax Credit Lim-
itations, 1 J. INT'L TAX'N. 5 (1990).
5 ". .I think we need to be very tough and hard in asking the question, is it worth the
candle? Are we really achieving our policy objectives or are we simply raising the cost of doing
business? Our data suggest that U.S.-based multinationals incur two to three times the cost of
the foreign-based counterparts in simply complying with our tax laws and our securities laws.
That is all bottom- line money. I believe it undermines their competitive position. It is not trivial
in amount, and I think that we just need to be as aggressive as we can in saying, are all these
provisions, all these rules, really necessary in light of what we are trying to accomplish?" Foreign
Income Tax Rationalization and Simplification Act of 1992: Hearings on H.R. 5270, 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. 256-257 (1992) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Hon. Fred T. Goldberg, Assistant
Secretary for Tax Policy).
6 In response to the question whether people both in the IRS and in the private sector can
even administrate certain areas of international tax law, Mr. Goldberg stated that in fact it was
true that certain areas of international tax law have ceased to be administrable. Id. (statement of
Hon. Fred T. Goldberg, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy).
7 Ronald M. Warren, Investment in United States Property by Controlled Foreign Corpora-
tions: A Proposal for Reform, 19 RuTGrs L. 367, 369 (1988).
8 Id. For an insightful discussion of how foreign individuals and corporations may be subject
to U.S. income tax on income sourced to the United States, see PmLw F. POSTLEWArrE &
TAMARA L. FRANZEN, INTERNA ONAL TAXATION §§ 4.01, 5.01 (1995).
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" Residence Based Taxation - all the income of a nation's residents is
taxed regardless of where it was earned.9
" Citizenship Based Taxation - all the income of a citizen of a particular
nation is taxed by that nation regardless of where the income is
earned.' 0
The United States utilizes all four bases of taxation." By employing
such a broad taxing jurisdiction the Code reaches more taxpayers and
conduct than most other nations,' 2 and necessarily includes the in-
come earned by U.S. owned foreign corporations.
The United States also adheres to a "classical double tax system"
which means that corporate income is taxed at two levels, once when a
corporation earns income and a second time when that corporation
makes a dividend to its shareholders.' 3 This two level tax also applies
if a U.S. shareholder invests in a foreign corporation.14 There are two
forms that this investment can take. First, a U.S. shareholder can in-
vest in a domestic corporation, known as a U.S. multinational corpo-
ration (MNC), which invests in foreign corporations. Second, a U.S.
shareholder could purchase shares directly in a foreign corporation.
Either way, one tax will be assessed at the foreign corporation's level,
and a second shareholder level tax will be imposed when a dividend
distribution is paid.
A foreign corporation can delay the U.S. shareholder level tax
indefinitely, however, by simply refusing to make dividends to its U.S.
shareholders. This concept, known as "deferral," does not decrease
the amount of dollars the U.S. shareholder will eventually have to
pay, but it does decrease the present value of her tax liability. This is
because a dollar paid to the U.S. Government three years from now is
less valuable than a dollar paid to the U.S. Government today.
Simply phrased then, the international tax debate revolves not so
much around "how much" tax is paid on income earned abroad.
Rather, the debate has traditionally focused on "when" U.S. taxes on
income earned by foreign corporations are paid. U.S. shareholders
generally argue that they should be allowed to push income recogni-
9 Ronald M. Warren, Note, Investment in United States Property by Controlled Foreign Cor-
porations: A Proposal for Reform, 19 RuTGERs LJ. 367, 369 (1988).
10 Id. at 369.
11 Id. at 369.
12 Christopher J. Lord, Note, Stapled Stock and LR.C. Section 269B: Ill-Conceived Change in
the Rules of International Tax Jurisdiction, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 1066, 1068 (1986).
13 Richard Doemberg, International Aspects of Individual and Corporate Tax Integration, 92




tion into the future and Congress and the Treasury generally attempt
to require current income recognition.
In order to prevent deferral from substantially decreasing tax rev-
enue, Congress has developed numerous devices which limit deferral
possibilities. These devices, known as "anti-deferral regimes," operate
by imposing the U.S. shareholder level tax on a U.S. shareholder's
proportionate share of a foreign corporation's income BEFORE an ac-
tual dividend is made.
The trend has been for Congress to make each successive anti-
deferral regime more aggressive in limiting deferral opportunities.
These regimes are arguably the most complex provisions of the rules
governing international taxation. Unfortunately, however, these re-
gimes were each developed to prevent a particular type of deferral
which Congress thought was abusive. They were not developed to
promote one overarching tax goal. As a result, they overlap and cause
considerable confusion.
The purpose of this comment will be to demonstrate that the in-
ternational tax provisions of the Code will never be simplified until
policy makers first answer the question, "What goal is the United
States trying to advance through its system of international taxation?"
Many analysts, and even the Treasury Department itself, have ad-
dressed this question. In an attempt to resolve this dilemma, this pa-
per will: 1) outline the goals currently being pursued in international
taxation; 2) describe each anti-deferral regime, and how each manages
to both foster and hinder different international tax goals; 3) analyze
one example of reform legislation and assess its impact on interna-
tional tax goals; 4) develop an analytical framework in order to deter-
mine what the United States' primary international tax goal should be;
and 5) outline the basic principles of an anti-deferral regime to further
that goal.
I. U.S. GOALS IN INTERNATIONAL TAXATION
The United States' pursuit of a myriad of unprioritized objectives
is the driving force behind the complexity in the U.S. system of inter-
national taxation. Hence, no reform can really be labeled "successful"
because a change that may improve the Code with respect to one goal
may actually make the Code worse with respect to another goal.
Five major goals being pursued by the U.S. currently 5 are:
15 Hearings, supra note 5, at id. (statement of Hon. Fred T. Goldberg, Assistant Secretary for
Tax Policy).
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* Simplification - making the administration of the tax laws easier.16
* Efficiency - the idea that the tax law should not distort the efficient
.allocation of resources.17
" Competitiveness - the idea that U.S. corporations should not be
placed at a tax disadvantage in either the international or domestic
market.'8
" Compatibility With International Tax Norms (Compatibility) - which
seeks elimination of double taxation, and nondiscrimination between
foreign and domestic investment.19
" Preservation of the U.S. Tax Base (Preservation) - the idea that the
U.S. should seek to prevent people and taxable economic activities
from leaving the country.
Since no single tax system can simultaneously advance all five goals,
they compete against each other for influence. This competition has
resulted in a compromise "two-pronged" approach which allows for-
eign corporations owned by U.S. shareholders to defer income as a
general rule,2' but subjects passive income to current taxation.22
In other words, usually a U.S. shareholder of a foreign corpora-
tion will not add the profits of her foreign corporation's active manu-
facturing operations to her gross income when that income is earned
by the foreign corporation. Rather, the corporation's income from ac-
tive manufacturing operations is deferred until the foreign corpora-
tion pays a dividend to the shareholder, at which time that dividend is
included in the U.S. shareholder's income.23 However, when the for-
eign corporation earns income which is particularly mobile24 and pas-
16 Simple rules are essential for four basic reasons: 1) they are less expensive to apply; 2)
simple rules minimize friction and transition costs; 3) they facilitate compliance and foster re-
spect for the tax system; and 4) they increase voluntary compliance. Hearings, supra note 5, at
id
17 Hearings, supra note 5, at id.
18 Hearings, supra note 5, at id.
19 Hearings, supra note 5, at id
20 Hearing, supra note 5, at id.
21 "United States tax law has included tax deferral of the income from foreign subsidiaries
since the inception of the corporate income tax in 1913." Glen M. Secor, Note, Runaway Plants,
Runaway Tax Policy: The Continuing Debate Over the Taxation of Controlled Foreign Corpora-
tions, 16 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 200, 203 (1992).
22 Hearings, supra note 5, at id
23 I.R.C. § 301(c).
24 Throughout this comment "mobile" refers to income which can be earned anywhere on
the globe with minimal or no effort. For example, dividends on General Motors stock can be
earned in the United States or Mexico, depending solely on where the recipient resides. How-
ever, income from the sale of cars can only be earned where the cars are in fact sold. Therefore,
dividends are referred to as mobile, whereas income from active operations is not mobile.
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sive,2 the shareholder is taxed currently through a series of "anti-
deferral regimes."
Each anti-deferral regime was developed to further one or more
international tax goals. However, as this comment will demonstrate,
the interaction between these regimes fosters competition between in-
ternational tax goals without significantly advancing any single goal.
These regimes are explained in detail below.
II. THE Awn-DEFERRAL REGIMES EXAMINED
There are five anti-deferral regimes which subject U.S. sharehold-
ers of foreign corporations to current income taxation prior to the cor-
poration's payment of a dividend. Each regime advances and hinders
different international tax goals. Section A of this part will describe
each of these regimes. Section B will address the problems which can
arise when more than one of these regimes apply to the same corpora-
tion. Lastly, section C will address the complications created by the
operation of the foreign tax credit in conjunction with each regime.
Interspersed throughout the sections will be an analysis of how each
regime interacts with the goals of international taxation.
A. The Regimes Described
1. Accumulated Earnings Tax
The first anti-deferral regime Congress developed was the Accu-
mulated Earnings Tax.26 This regime applies to both domestic and for-
eign corporations.27 Its purpose is to prevent U.S. citizens or residents
from throwing their money into corporations formed solely for the
purpose of holding its shareholders' investments. Such an arrange-
ment has the advantage of deferring the tax associated with the in-
come earned on such investments to future years. The regime
operates by imposing a 39.6% tax on any earnings and profits of a
corporation which are allowed to accumulate beyond the "reasonable
needs of the business. '2 8 However, this regime is easily sidestepped
25 Passive income simply refers to income earned by a recipient who is not actively engaged
in the business which produced the income (i.e. - dividends, rents, royalties etc.).
26 William H. Hoffman, Jr. & Mary Sue Gately, Post-1984 Act Planning to Avoid Taxation of
Foreign Personal Holding Company Income, 64 J. TAX'N. 92 (1986).
27 Domestic and foreign corporations are subject to the Accumulated Earnings Tax unless
they are determined to be either a: 1) Personal Holding Company; 2) Foreign Personal Holding
Company; or 3) a Passive Foreign Investment Company. In that case the corporation will be
exempt from the Accumulated Earnings Tax by § 532(b). Treas. Reg. § 1.532-1.
28 I.R.C. § 531 imposes a tax on the Accumulated Taxable Income(defined in § 535). Accu-
mulated Taxable Income is an amount which exceeds the amount of earnings and profits that a
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because a reasonable business need can be manufactured without sub-
stantial difficulty. 9
The very existence of this regime as a trap for unwary tax plan-
ners hinders the goal of Simplicity. However, it does attempt, unsuc-
cessfully, to preserve the tax base by preventing unlimited deferral
abroad.
2. Foreign Personal Holding Company Regime
In 1937, Congress developed something called the Foreign Per-
sonal Holding Company (FPHC) regime,30 which operates by includ-
ing the undistributed FPHC income of a FPHC in the gross incomes
of its U.S. shareholders. 31 A FPHC is defined as any foreign corpora-
tion which: 1) has at least sixty percent of its gross income as FPHC
income; and 2) at any time during the taxable year more than fifty
percent of the company (measured by vote or value) is owned by five
or fewer U.S. citizens or residents (the U.S. group).3' FPHC income is
defined as dividends, interest, rents, royalties, and gains from the sale
of stocks or commodities. 33 Therefore, the FPHC regime targets cor-
porations earning large amounts of passive income.
The FPHC regime attempts to preserve the tax base by eliminat-
ing certain deferral opportunities. However, it definitely hinders the
goal of Competitiveness by subjecting U.S. shareholders to current
taxation on their foreign operations.
3. Subpart F Regime
Prior to 1962, U.S. shareholders could still create corporations in
low tax jurisdictions and "owe no U.S. tax until funds were distributed
from the foreign corporation. '34 However, President Kennedy be-
business would reasonably need. How much income a business would reasonably need is de-
fined in § 537.
29 Hoffman, supra note 26. After all, Treas. Reg. § 1.537-1(b) states that reasonably antici-
pated needs include any plan which is specific, definite and feasible. Therefore, to avoid the
regime, all one needs to do is to develop a specific plan to invest the company's earnings and
profits in order to escape the regime. The money does not, in fact, have to be spent on anything.
30 Due to the problems inherent in asserting taxing jurisdiction over foreign entities, Con-
gress for the first time made the U.S. shareholder the target of the regime. The AET adds an
additional tax to the corporation itself. The FPHC regime works differently. The FPHC regime
"imputes" the income from the company to the shareholder and then taxes the U.S. shareholder
on that income, whether or not the shareholder has received a distribution from the corporation.
Hoffman, supra note 26.
31 I.R.C. § 551(a).
32 I.R.C. § 552(a)(1) & (2).
33 I.R.C. § 553(a).




lieved that the existence of tax haven countries,35 and the opportuni-
ties for deferral which they created, caused U.S. shareholders to invest
heavily abroad, thereby upsetting the efficient allocation of re-
sources.36 In 1962, Kennedy sought a complete end to deferral,
whereby U.S. shareholders would pay U.S. tax currently on any in-
come they earned from foreign corporations.37 However, large U.S.
corporations were opposed to this solution and a compromise was
reached whereby deferral would be ended only for those types of in-
come which were deemed abusive.38 This compromise is known as the
Subpart F regime.
The Subpart F regime only applies to controlled foreign corpora-
tions (CFCs). A foreign corporation becomes a CFC if more than fifty
percent of the corporation (measured by vote or value) is owned by
U.S. persons.39 Unlike the AET, PHC and FPHC regimes, which only
target corporations earning large amounts of passive income, the Sub-
part F regime applies to any CFC, regardless of what type of income it
generates.
Subpart F's minimum ownership requirement creates a potential
loophole whereby an investor can avoid the perils of current taxation
by simply reducing his or her ownership levels below that required
under the regime. The obvious problem with this strategy, however, is
that the investor loses control over its foreign subsidiary.
Before 1984, however, domestic corporations with overseas sub-
sidiaries could utilize something called "stapled stock arrange-
ments. '40 If the domestic corporation was widely held, this maneuver
dispersed ownership, prevented the foreign corporation from meeting
the control requirements of Subpart F, or the FPHC regime for that
matter, and at the same time allowed a parent corporation to retain
control of its subsidiary, because the same group of shareholders
owned both the parent and the subsidiary.41
Congress passed I.R.C. § 269B in response to this opportunity.
Section 269B provides that if a domestic and foreign corporation are
35 Countries which impose very low or zero rates of tax on investment in their countries.
36 Warren, supra note 7, at 375.
37 Warren, supra note 7, at 375.
38 Warren, supra note 7, at 376.
39 I.R.C. § 957(a).
40 A stapled stock arrangement occurs when one corporation links its stock to that of an-
other independent corporation such that any disposition of an interest in one of the corporations
causes a simultaneous disposition of an interest in the other stapled corporation. See Lord, supra
note 12, at 1073.
41 See Lord, supra note 12, at 1066.
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considered to be "stapled," the foreign corporation will be considered
a domestic corporation, subject to current U.S. taxation.42
Section 269B has been criticized as a radical departure from ac-
cepted rules of international tax jurisdiction.43 Whereas Subpart F im-
poses a tax on the U.S. shareholder, § 269B actually asserts taxing
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation, as if it were a domestic corpo-
ration.44 In order to accomplish this, § 269B unilaterally overrides any
treaty obligation that the U.S. may have had that would protect that
foreign corporation from current taxation.45 Although Congress was
within its power to do so, "this unilateral modification of bilaterally
negotiated treaties seriously jeopardizes [the treaties'] viability and
the continued cooperation of treaty partners. '46 As a result, § 269B
constitutes a serious violation of international tax norms and a sacri-
fice of the international tax goal of Simplification.
Subpart F operates by requiring each U.S. shareholder 47 of a con-
trolled foreign corporation to include in income: 1) his or her pro rata
share of the corporation's Subpart F income for such year, and 2) his
or her pro rata share of the corporation's increase in earnings invested
in United States property for such year.4s Subpart F income, the type
of income which the Subpart F regime targets, has been referred to as
"tax haven" type income.49 This income tends to be of a type which is
easily moved from one taxing jurisdiction to another and is typically
subject to low rates of tax in many foreign jurisdictions. 50
As originally conceived, the Subpart F regime could be avoided
by having the CFC repatriate its earnings in the form of U.S. invest-
ments which were beneficial to the CFC's shareholders. 51 Subpart F
42 I.R.C. § 269B(a)(1).
43 Lord, supra note 12, at 1087.
44 Lord, supra note 12, at 1087-88
45 I.R.C. § 269B(d).
46 "The important role played by tax treaties in United States tax policy greatly outweighs
the anticipated increase in tax revenues generated by § 269B." Lord, supra note 12, at 1090.
47 U.S. shareholder is defined as any U.S. person who owns or is considered to own ten
percent or more of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote of such
foreign corporation. I.R.C. § 951(b).
48 I.R.C. § 951(a)(1)(A) & (B).
49 William J. Bricker, Jr., Subpart F, at 2 (PLI TAX L. & EST. PLAN. COURSE HANDBOOK
SERIES TAX L. & PRAC., 1989).
50 H.R. Rep. No. 353, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., at 79 (1993).
51 For example, assume a U.S. MNC wishes to build a plant in America. Instead of having a
foreign subsidiary declare a dividend to the U.S. MNC, which would then purchase the plant, the
U.S. MNC could simply force the foreign subsidiary to buy the plant directly. If the U.S. MNC
controls 100% of the stock of the foreign subsidiary, it would still indirectly control the plant and
it would escape the U.S. taxation that would result from a dividend.
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was amended, however, and now subjects the earnings of a CFC which
are reinvested in U.S. property to current taxation.
52
Treas. Reg. § 1.956-2T(d)(2) closes a loophole in the application
of the aforementioned amendment to Subpart F. Before this regula-
tion was released in 1988, a loan from a CFC to a domestic corpora-
tion was NOT considered to be an investment in U.S. property if it
was collected within a year from the time it was made.53 Therefore,
CFCs could avoid having a Subpart F inclusion, and subjecting their
shareholders to current taxation, by making a loan to its U.S. parent,
having the loan repaid before the end of the year, and making a new
loan on the first day of the next year.54 In response, the Treasury De-
partment created § 1.956-2T(d)(2), which mandated that any such
loans between related parties would have to be "ordinary and neces-
sary" to carry on the business of the two corporations, determined as
if they had been unrelated.55 Congress went even further, however, in
1993 and revised Subpart F so that the amount of a foreign subsidi-
52 The scenario referred to in the previous footnote is prevented by § 956(c)(1) which states
that tangible property located in the U.S. is considered U.S. property. Section 956(a)(2) then
imputes to the U.S. shareholder his or her pro rata share of that investment, to the extent that it
would have constituted a dividend had it been distributed. Treas. Reg. § 1.956-1(b)(1).
For example, assume that A is a U.S. Corporation directly owning 60% of a foreign corpo-
ration R, which is a controlled foreign corporation. On 12/31/95, Corporation R owned $150,000
of U.S. property, which would constitute a dividend if distributed on such date. Also assume that
R made $50,000 of actual distributions during 1964, which were previously included in the in-
come of its U.S. shareholders. Further assume that R has $250,000 of U.S. property investments,
$225,000 of which would otherwise constitute a dividend if distributed on 12/31/96. A's pro rata
share of R's investment in U.S. property would be equal to:
U.S. Investments on 12/31/96 $250,000
Earnings and Profits 12/31/96 $225,000
U.S. Investment 12/31/95 (150,000)
Previously taxed 1995 distributions 50,000 $100,000
Increase in U.S. investment for the year $125,000
A's share of R's $100,000 increase in U.S. investment for the year would be 60% of $125,000 or
$75,000. This $75,000 would then be subject to current income taxation under § 951(a)(1)(B).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.956-1(d) Example 1.
It should be noted that Congress took an even bolder step towards the elimination of defer-
ral under the Subpart F regime with the enactment in 1993 of 956A, which imposes current
taxation on a CFC if it simply accumulates excess amounts of passive income. For an extremely
thorough and insightful discussion of this new wrinkle on Subpart F and its implications for tax
planning see John M. Peterson, Jr., et. al., A Passive-Aggressive Approach to Anti-Deferral in the
1990s: Critical Analysis and Planning Techniques Under Section 956A, 72 TAXEs 1084 (1994).
53 Hearings, supra note 5, at id. Recall that if a foreign subsidiary holds an obligation of a
U.S. person they are deemed to have an investment in U.S. property under § 956 which is then
imputed to the U.S. shareholder through § 951 and subjected to current taxation.
54 Hearings, supra note 5, at id.
55 Treas. Reg. § 1.956-2T(d)(2)(B).
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ary's assets invested in United States property would be measured
every quarter instead of every year.56
By closing this loophole, Treasury and Congress furthered Effi-
ciency by removing tax considerations as a motivation for CFCs to
invest in the United States. However, at the same time they sacrificed
Simplicity, because CFCs are now forced to account for their assets
four times as often as they used to, and Preservation, because CFCs
will be encouraged to reinvest abroad instead of reinvesting their ac-
cumulated profits in the United States!
4. Foreign Investment Company Regime
If a shareholder is willing to forego the advantages of deferral, he
or she can eliminate the double taxation inherent in corporate invest-
ments by investing in a Regulated Investment Company (RIC).57
RICs are treated as pass-through entities for tax purposes and so do
not pay a corporate level tax.58 However, taxpayers soon learned that
they could get the advantage of deferral as well as one level of taxa-
tion if they invested in offshore investment funds.59 A foreign invest-
ment fund will only be taxed by the U.S. at the corporate level if it has
income from sources within the United States,60 and the U.S. investor
will pay no tax on the income until she receives a dividend. 61 Con-
gress therefore became concerned that these foreign funds were not
paying any U.S. taxes.62
56 The Senate report accompanying the bill suggests that this provision is intended to be
applied so as to disregard any short term loans where one of the principal purposes is the avoid-
ance of taking assets into account for purposes of § 956. S. Rep. No. 103-66, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess., at 12 (1993).
57 Section 851(a)(1) defines a Regulated Investment Company as any domestic corporation
registered as either a management company or a unit investment trust under the Investment
Company Act of 1940.
58 More specifically, assuming that an RIC distributes 90% or more of its income every year,
§ 852(b)(2)(D) allows the RIC a dividends paid deduction. Therefore, it is more exact to say
that any income distributed by the RIC will only be taxed once at the shareholder level.
59 See JACOB MERTENS, JR., LAw OF FEDERAL TAxATiON § 45H.01 (David B. Newman ed.,
1994).
60 I.R.C. § 871. However, even if the foreign fund has investments in the United States it
will be subject to a flat 30% tax. Generally, a foreign corporation will pay regular corporate rates
of tax on any income effectively connected with a trade or business in the United States. I.R.C.
§ 871(b)(1). However, I.R.C. § 864(b)(2) states that trading in securities will NOT be considered
a trade or business in the United States. Therefore, the income from such investments will prob-
ably be considered FDAP or fixed determinable annual or periodic income which is subject to a
flat 30% tax imposed on a gross basis.
61 I.R.C. § 301.
62 "Under present law a foreign investment company usually pays no U.S. income tax, since




Congress developed the Foreign Investment Company (FIC) re-
gime in response to this abuse.63 A FIC is any foreign company which,
at a time when fifty percent or more of the vote or value of the com-
pany is held directly by U.S. persons, either: 1) is registered under the
Investment Company Act of 1940 as a management company or a unit
investment trust; or 2) is engaged (or holds itself out as being en-
gaged) primarily in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in
securities, commodities, or any interest in commodities or securities.6 4
The regime provides that the gain from any sale of FIC stock would
be ordinary income, rather than capital gain income unless the FIC
distributes ninety percent of its income to its shareholders. 65
This regime became irrelevant for a number of reasons. First, it
required U.S. control, so U.S. investors in foreign controlled funds
were completely exempt from the regime.6 Second, the penalty for
being an FIC (ordinary income treatment of gain on sale of FIC stock)
lost its punitive edge when the marginal tax rates on capital gain and
ordinary income were integrated. 67 Finally, it is very difficult for a
company to be an FIC and not be a Passive Foreign Investment Com-
pany, a characterization which subjects the corporation to a much
more stringent regime.68 Nevertheless, it remains as a trap for the un-
wary and thereby only serves to hinder the goal of Simplicity without
any corresponding advancement of other international tax goals.
5. Passive Foreign Investment Company Regime
The Passive Foreign Investment Company (PFIC) regime accom-
plished what the FIC regime set out to do, which was to eliminate any
incentive U.S. investors would have to invest in offshore investment
funds.69 A foreign corporation is a PFIC if: 1) seventy-five percent or
companies generally have no U.S. securities and, therefore, have no income from U.S. sources."
S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 101 (1962).
63 See Mertens, supra note 59.
64 I.R.C. § 1246(b).
65 I.R.C. § 1246(a)(1); I.R.C. § 1247(a).
66 David A. Tillinghast, International Tax Simplification, 8 Am. J. TAX POL'Y 187, 202-03
(1990).
67 Id. It should be noted, however, that the motivation for avoiding the FIC regime may be
stronger now that the highest marginal rate is 39.6%, whereas the capital gains tax rate is capped
at 28%. I.R.C. § 11. As the disparity between these two numbers grows, the FIC regime will
become more important again.
68 See Tillinghast, supra note 66, at id. This is because the purpose of a foreign investment
company is to hold passive investments, and substantial amounts of passive investments will
subject a corporation to the Passive Foreign Investment Company Regime.
69 See Richard J. Shapiro & Roger D. Lorence, PFICs Pose Significant Hazards for U.S.
Investment Companies, 2 J. Nr'L TAX'N. 185 (1991).
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more of its gross income is passive income;70 or 2) fifty percent or
more of the average value of the assets held by such corporation dur-
ing the taxable year produce passive income or are held for the pro-
duction of passive income.71
The PFIC regime ends deferral in either of two ways. First, a tax-
payer may, pursuant to I.R.C. § 1295, make an election to have his
investment treated as a qualified electing fund (QEF). A taxpayer
making such an election includes his pro rata share of the foreign cor-
poration's earnings in gross income every year.72 These income inclu-
sions increase the shareholder's basis in his or her PFIC stock.73
Second, the shareholder may, alternatively, fail to elect QEF status
and therefore be subject to the "interest charge method."74 Under this
mechanism, if a PFIC makes a distribution which is considered exces-
sive,75 the excessive portion of that distribution will be allocated rata-
bly over the shareholder's holding period for that stock.76 Then, an
interest charge will be assessed on those amounts allocated to prior
years.77 By charging interest on the income the PFIC has deferred,
this method eliminates any benefit the shareholder would ordinarily
derive from postponing dividends and pushing the corresponding in-
come inclusion into the future.78
70 Passive income for purposes of the PFIC regime is defined in I.R.C. § 954(c) as interest,
rents, royalties and annuities or any property transactions which give rise to the foregoing types
of income.
71 I.R.C. § 1296(a).
72 I.R.C. § 1293(1); Any amount thus included retains its character as either ordinary income
or capital gain as per § 1293(a)(1)(A) & (B).
73 I.R.C. § 1293(d).
74 I.R.C. § 1291(a).
75 An excessive distribution is defined as any distribution which exceeds 125% of the aver-
age of the three previous year's distributions. I.R.C. § 1291(b).
76 I.R.C. § 1291(a).
77 I.R.C. § 1291(c)(3).
78 For example, assume that P, a U.S. shareholder owns 100% of S, a PFIC. S earns:
1988 1989 1990 1991
225 225 225 275
However, assume that S only chooses to distribute:
1988 1989 1990 1991200 200 200 350
If P has made a QEF election, then P will include 100% of S's income in its gross income for
each of the years 1988-1991. If P has not made this election, P will have deferred recognition of
$75 of S's income to 1991. This is because S earned $25 more than it distributed in each of the
previous three years. If no QEF election is in effect, P does not have to include all of S's income




The PFIC regime is very draconian because it eliminates the in-
centives for deferral, and unlike the FIC, FPHC, and Subpart F re-
gimes, it has no control requirement. Therefore, anyone caught
deferring income will be penalized, not just large shareholders. It may
be that the PFIC regime goes a little too far. In fact, one commentator
has dubbed it, "a prime example of legislative overkill." 7 9
The PFIC regime has problems in: 1) its basic operation; and 2)
the companies that it targets. Each problem illustrates how interna-
tional tax goals are forced to compete with each other for dominance.
a) Basic Operation
1. Income Allocation
A major problem for the PFIC regime is that it may penalize a
corporation that has not deferred any income!80 Although the inter-
Without the interest charge regime, the $75 would be taxed in 1991. This deferral would
have two advantages. First, if tax rates went down between 1988 and 1991, the after tax return on
the income would obviously be higher. Second, even if tax rates remain the same, P has de-
creased the present value of his tax liability.
However, this advantage will not be realized because of the interest charge method. Since
the 1991 distribution exceeds 125% of the average of the three preceding years' distributions,
$100 of the 1991 distribution will be considered an "excess distribution" as per § 1291(b). As-
suming that P has held this stock since the beginning of 1988, $25 will be allocated to each year
from 1988 to 1991 as per § 1291(a)(1)(A), and that $25 will be subject to the highest marginal
rates existing in that year. § 1291(c)(2). Moreover, since P did not pay tax on these amounts in
the years to which they relate, he will have to pay interest assessed under § 6621 on each alloca-
tion. § 1291(c)(3). For example, if we assume the highest marginal tax rate in existence in 1988
was 34%, the tax owed on only the $25 allocated to 1988 will be = $25 X 34% = $8.50 of tax due
on March 15, 1989. The tax liability then incurs interest, computed under § 6621, from March
15th of 1989 until it is paid in March of 1992!
79 Tax Executives Institute, Comments on Proposed Tax Simplification Legislation, 43 TAX
ExEcutrvE 339, 342 (1991)
80 Assume that S is a PFIC which earns:
1988 1989 1990 1991
0 0 0 325
Also assume that S does not qualify for the start up company exemption of § 1297(b)(2).
S distributes:
1988 1989 1990 1991
0 0 0 325
In this example there has been NO DEFERRAL! S has distributed all of its income in the years
in which it was earned. Nevertheless, since the 1991 distribution exceeds 125% of the average of
the three preceding years' distributions, (because $325 > 125% X (0+0+0)/3) it will be deemed
an excess distribution and will be allocated pro rata over the shareholder's holding period.
Therefore, in this situation, S and P would be better of if S slowly ratchets up the distributions in
order to increase the three year average. But this is clearly not the result desired because that
would increase deferral!
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est charge method preserves the tax base by discouraging an outflow
of capital, it may thwart the goal of Efficiency by providing an incen-
tive to invest in the U.S..
For example, a U.S. taxpayer who invests in an RIC will generally
not get the benefits of deferral, because the RIC will distribute its
income currently to avoid paying the corporate level tax.81 Similarly, a
U.S. shareholder in a PFIC will ordinarily not get the benefits of
deferral because she will be taxed currently on the PFIC's income
under either the QEF election or the interest charge regime. Yet, the
shareholder of an RIC will never be taxed for years when no income is
earned. However, a U.S. shareholder of a PFIC may in fact be subject
to an interest penalty on income allocated to years when no income
was earned. As a result, a U.S. investor is better off investing in a
domestic corporation that is considered an RIC than a foreign corpo-
ration considered a PFIC.
2. Double Taxation
Since the interest charge method is not linked to the income of
the foreign subsidiary, 82 its application may result in a taxation of ba-
sis! For example, assume domestic corporation P buys all of the stock
of foreign corporation S for $1,000. S earns:
1988 1989 1990 1991
100 100 100 100
S distributes:
1988 1989 1990 1991
100 100 100 500
This same problem manifests itself in a sale of PFIC stock. See Ernest R. Larkins, Interna-
tional Commerce Through a Foreign Subsidiary: Navigating the Anti-Haven Tax Shoals of the
Internal Revenue Code, 9 IN'L. TAx & Bus. LAw. 64, 75 (1991). Specifically, if a shareholder
sells PFIC tainted stock, the gain is considered a distribution under § 1291 and therefore may be
considered an "excess distribution" subject to the interest charge method. Treas. Reg. § 1.1291-
3(a). Moreover, § 1291(d) states that even a pledge of PFIC stock as security for a loan will be
considered a distribution which may be subject to the interest charge regime. The amount of the
pledge considered to be a distribution is the lower of the fair market value of the stock pledged
or the unpaid principle of the loan secured - the basis in the PFIC stock. Treas. Reg. § 1.1291-
3(d)(1).
81 RICs get a dividends paid deduction if 90% of its income is distributed. I.R.C.
§ 852(b)(2)(D).




$375 of the 1991 distribution will be treated as an excess distribution83
and will be allocated ratably over P's holding period. But $100 of that
$375 is a return of the initial investment! This situation is just as if
someone gave $100 to a foreign corporation which returned it two
years later. No income has been deferred, and no U.S. taxes have
been avoided. Nevertheless, P will be assessed an interest charge
when the PFIC simply returns his basis in the stock.
Although this anomaly may help preserve the tax base (by penal-
izing foreign investment), it sacrifices the goal of Efficiency, because
shareholders in a domestic corporation are not taxed on returns of
their initial capital contribution. This anomaly also violates the goal of
Compatibility. After all, taxing basis, which was purchased with after-
tax dollars, is similar to double taxation, which is contrary to interna-
tional tax norms.'
b) The Companies that PFIC targets
It has already been noted that a company can be a PFIC if it
meets either the seventy-five percent gross income requirement or the
fifty percent asset requirement.' Both tests have been criticized as
being overly draconian by sweeping too many active manufacturing
companies into the PFIC net. 6
1. The Income Test
It is very easy for an active manufacturing enterprise to fail the
income test and wind up being classified as a PFIC.87 This provides a
83 (100 +100+100)/3 * 125% = $125. 500-125 = $375 excess distribution.
84 This income allocation anomaly can actually be manipulated to the shareholder's advan-
tage. For example, if you know that your business will have substantial increases in earnings in
future years, when you expect marginal rates to be higher, it would make sense to fail to make
the QEF election and be subject to the interest charge method. When the PFIC actually does
make a distribution, much of it will be allocated back to those years in which the highest margi-
nal rates were lower. ( It is important to note however, that the shareholder would have to be
able to invest money at a rate at least equal to or exceeding the rate imposed by the interest
charge method or else this scheme would not make sense.) See Larkins, supra note 80, at 76 for
a demonstration of how the income allocation method operates.
85 I.R.C. § 1296(a)(1).
86 "Many, if not most, active foreign subsidiaries of U.S. parents are PFICs though the U.S.
parents may not be aware of this." John S. Karls, New PFIC Regs. Have Strong Impact on Active
Foreign Subsidiaries, 3 J. INT'L TAX'N. 133 (1992).
87 For example, assume that an active wholly-owned foreign subsidiary of a U.S. MNC incurs
$10,000,000 in cost of goods sold. Further assume that the subsidiary, in response to competitive
pressures, decided that it could not raise its prices above the break even point and so had
$10,000,000 in revenue. Although the subsidiary has no active income, it does have a bank ac-
count from which it derives $100 of interest during the year. This active manufacturing subsidi-
ary is a PFIC and will remain a PFIC in every subsequent year. In order to avoid the PFIC
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disincentive for U.S. shareholders to create manufacturing companies
abroad, which helps to preserve the U.S. tax base. However, it does so
at the expense of Competitiveness, because foreign owned competi-
tors are not subject to the PFIC regime.
2. The Asset Test
It is also very easy to fail the asset test and thereby trigger the
application of the PFIC regime."8 For example, many U.S. sharehold-
ers develop foreign marketing subsidiaries, which act as sales agents in
order to sell their goods overseas.89 These marketing subsidiaries
rarely take title to the goods and so have no inventory or trade receiv-
ables.9° It is likely, then, that the marketing subsidiary's only asset will
be a bank account from which expenses are paid.91 If this is the case,
the marketing subsidiary, although an integral part of an active manu-
facturing venture, will be considered a PFIC.92
It becomes particularly easy to fail the asset test when the look
through rules apply.93 As a result, U.S. shareholders usually try to
regime, the active manufacturing subsidiary would have to refrain from the competitive price
cut. John S. Karls, PFIC/PFC Planning for Active Foreign Subsidiaries, 2 J. Ir'L. TAX'N. 205
(1991).
88 It is so easy to fail that the Senate actually introduced legislation in 1991 in order to repeal
the asset test. Senator Moynihan stated in support of the bill: "It is that asset test that has been
the most difficulty, because a company can flunk and be considered a PFIC for any number of
innocent reasons, even though it is genuinely and predominantly engaged in the conduct of ac-
tive business operations .... [T]he rules have come to encourage practices motivated by tax
planning that distort sound business decisions - such as delaying the collection of accounts
receivable to avoid failing the asset test. But most importantly, experience with the asset has
shown that it imposes the PFIC loss-of-deferral penalty in an arbitrary and overly broad way on
companies that were not intended to be penalized."137 CONG. RE. S12219 (statement of Sena-
tor Moynihan). The bill, however, was not enacted.




92 I.R.C. § 1296(a)(2) states that a corporation will be a PFIC if 50% or more of its assets
produce passive income. According to the Treasury Department, "Cash and other current assets
readily convertible into cash, including assets which may be characterized as the working capital
of an active business, produce passive income... ". I.R.S. Notice 88-22, 1988-1 CB 489.
93 I.R.C. § 1296(c). Under the look through rules, if a U.S. MNC owns a foreign corporation
(1st tier subsidiary), which in turn owns more than 25% of another foreign corporation (second
tier subsidiary), that second tier subsidiary's assets will be imputed to the first tier subsidiary for
the purposes of the asset test. § 1296(c). However, these assets are imputed on a gross basis!
I.R.S. Notice 88-22, 1988-1 CB 489. This means that if the second tier subsidiary has only one
passive asset worth $1,000,000 purchased with $10,000 of equity financing and a $990,000 loan,
$1,000,000 of the asset is imputed to the first tier subsidiary, not the $10,000. Richard J. Shapiro
and Roger D. Lorence, PFICs Pose Signifcant Hazards for U.S. Investment Companies, 2 J.
INr'L TAx'N. 185 (1991).
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structure their foreign holdings so that a subsidiary possessing numer-
ous passive assets is the parent of many active manufacturing subsidi-
aries, and thereby take advantage of the look through rules.94
By sweeping so broadly, the asset test furthers Efficiency by en-
suring that more foreign subsidiaries will not derive any benefits de-
nied to domestic corporations. In the process, however, the asset test
sacrifices the goal of Competitiveness by forcing active overseas man-
ufacturing operations to be subject to the PFIC regime, thereby in-
creasing their tax liabilities over what they would be if they were only
subject to the Subpart F regime.
3. Regulated Investment Companies
Lastly, PFIC can have particularly disastrous results for Regu-
lated Investment Companies,95 the exact same companies that the re-
gime was intended to help.96 Specifically, the PFIC regime subjects
any RIC which owns stock in a PFIC to two levels of taxation instead
of one.
97
RICs, in order to comply with the asset diversification require-
ments imposed by the Code, often cannot own a large percentage of
any corporation.98 Therefore, if an RIC invests in a PFIC, it is doubt-
94 There are numerous advantages, for example, of creating one single finance subsidiary
overseas to hedge against any foreign currency losses. If a company has both a German manufac-
turing company which creates a lot of payables denominated in the German Mark and a sales
subsidiary which generates primarily receivables generated in the German Mark, it would be-
hoove the U.S. parent to create a finance subsidiary. This is because instead of having both the
manufacturing and sales subsidiary hedging their positions, the finance subsidiary can be more
efficient by looking at the overall picture and seeing whether there is a "net asset" or "net
liability" position which needs to be hedged. Richard J. Shapiro and Roger D. Lorence, PFICs
Pose Significant Hazards for U.S. Investment Companies,2 J. Irr'.L TAX'N. 185 (1991). The prob-
lem is that any gains or losses on currency contracts will be considered passive. This is because
passive income for purposes of § 1296(b) is Foreign Personal Holding Company Income. Foreign
Personal Holding Company Income includes the excess of foreign currency gains over foreign
currency losses. I.R.C. § 954(c)(1)(D).
However, by placing the finance subsidiary on top of the sales and manufacturing subsidiar-
ies, the § 1296 look through rules work in favor of the finance subsidiary by imputing the active
assets of the two second tier subsidiaries to the finance subsidiary and helping to avoid the asset
test. Bruce W. Reynolds, Nicholas J. Denovio, and George Mundstock, RRA '93 Anti-Deferral
Provisions Create Planning Hurdles for CFCs, 5 J. IN~rr'. TAX'N. 52 (1994).
95 Recall that Regulated Investment Companies are those domestic corporations registered
under the Investment Company Act of 1940. I.R.C. § 854(a)(1)(A).
96 Labrenda Garret Stodghill, Applying PFIC Rules to RICs Can Cause Double Taxation, 2 J.
INT'L. TAx'N. 100 (1991).
97 Id.
98 An RIC cannot have more than 25% of its total assets (measured by value) invested in the
securities of any one issuer. I.R.C. § 851(b)(4)(B).
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ful the RIC will be able to make a QEF election.99 The RIC will there-
fore be trapped under the interest charge regime, which imposes two
taxes.' The RIC will pay the tax computed under the interest charge
method on any excess distribution, and the shareholder of the RIC
will pay another tax when the RIC receives a dividend.101
So, by trying to preserve the tax base, the Code sacrifices Effi-
ciency by penalizing RICs which invest in foreign corporations as op-
posed to domestic corporations. Although not every foreign
subsidiary is a PFIC, it has been illustrated that it is difficult to deter-
mine which companies will be PFICs, and once they are considered
PFICs it is too late to do anything about it.102
B. Overlap Problems
A frightening new level of complexity presents itself when more
than one regime applies to the same corporation. Although the Code
provides basic guidance with respect to the interaction of the various
regimes, 10 3 the application of multiple regimes tends to cause an expo-
nential degree of complexity with a corresponding sacrifice of the goal
of Simplicity.
In order to avoid being caught under the PFIC regime, many U.S.
shareholders use the look through rules to their advantage by struc-
turing their holdings overseas such that the first tier foreign subsidiary
is a company with primarily passive assets. However, if the foreign
subsidiaries are both CFCs and PFICs then both the Subpart F and
PFIC provisions apply, and the aforementioned tax planning tip be-
comes useless.1°4
99 "While a QEF election would enable a RIC to avoid tax at the RIC level (by virtue of a
distribution equal to the income deemed received), this election is not a practical solution for the
large number of RICs whose ownership percentages in PFICs do not carry sufficient influence to
cause the PFIC to comply with the accounting and reporting requirements prescribed by Treas.
Reg. § 1.1295-1T. Thus the typical RIC holding PFIC stock is subject to the interest-charge
regime for non qualified funds." Labrenda Garret Stodghill, Applying PFIC Rules to RICs Can
Cause Double Taxation, 2 J. INrr'L TAx'N. 100 (1991).
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 This is because § 1297(b)(1) mandates that once you are a PFIC you are always a PFIC.
103 Basically, § 951(d) states that Subpart F inclusions have priority over FPHC inclusions,
and § 951(f) states that Subpart F takes precedence over PFIC inclusions. Finally, § 551(g) states
that FPHC inclusions have precedence over § 1293 PFIC inclusions.
104 Under the Subpart F rules, such a corporate structure only increases the active manufac-
turing subsidiary's chances of being caught holding excess passive assets, and therefore subject to
a Subpart F inclusion. This is because § 956A treats CFC "groups" meeting certain stock owner-
ship requirements as one corporation. For an extremely thorough analysis of the intracacies of
§ 956A see Peterson, Jr., et. al., supra note 52.
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Another odd result occurs when a foreign subsidiary is both a
CFC and a FPHC. Under the Subpart F rules, income which is already
subject to high tax rates'015 is NOT considered Subpart F income and
so is not subject to current taxation.0 6 However, if the CFC is also a
FPHC, the income would be subject to current taxation.10 7 There does
not seem to be any rational justification for the difference.
This complex overlap also gives rise to opportunity. For example,
an advantage of being both a CFC and a PFIC is that the astute tax
planner may be able to play one regime off of the other. Specifically, it
may be possible to avoid the interest charge regime without making a
QEF election. 08 The advantage of this would be partial deferral of
105 High rates of tax are defined as tax rates which exceed 90% of the tax rates imposed by
I.R.C. § 11. I.R.C. § 954(b)(4).
106 I.R.C. § 954(b)(4).
107 Under present law the "high tax exception" of § 954(b)(4) does not apply to a company
which is both a FPHC and a CFC. H.R. Rep. No. 353, at 104.
108 § 1297(b)(9) states that income inclusions under § 951(a)(1)(B) or (C) shall be considered
"distributions" for purposes of the PFIC regime. Colman J. Burke, Excess Passive Asset Rules of
RRA '93 Require Current Inclusion in Income, 79 J. TAX'WN. 314,316 (1993). Income from a CFC
is included currently in a shareholder's income under § 951(a)(1)(B) only if the CFC has in-
creased its investment in the United States property determined under § 956. Income from a
CFC is included currently in shareholder's income under § 951(a)(1)(C) if the CFC has invest-
ments in excess passive assets determined under § 956A. It should be noted that regular inclu-
sions of Subpart F income under § 951(a)(1)(A) are NOT treated as distributions for purposes of
the PFIC regime. Treas. Reg. § 1.1291-2(b)(2)(i).
The main advantage to this overlap of the PFIC and CFC regimes is that the CFC can more
easily assure avoidance of the interest charge regime, without having to make a QEF election
and thereby get the benefit of partial deferral. For example, assume a foreign corporation
formed in 1994 is both a CFC and a PFIC. It earns the following amounts:
1994 1995 1996 1997
300 400 500 600
Further assume that the CFC cannot make a cash dividend in 1994, 1995, or 1996 because it
would increase the debt to equity ratio of the CFC and cause a violation of a loan covenant or it
would decrease the amount of credit available to the CFC. However, the CFC's shareholder's
are anxious to earn a return on their investment and they expect to have a distribution of $250
made in 1997, when the CFC will be less leveraged. The CFC basically has three options:
1) They could make a cash distribution of $250 in 1997. This would be unwise, however, because
it would be considered an excess distribution and therefore be subject to the interest charge
regime.
2) Another alternative might be to make dividend distributions in 1994, 1995, and 1996, thereby
ratcheting up the preceding three year average and decreasing the chances that the 1997 distri-
bution will be considered excessive. The problem is that this will decrease cash reserves in those
years, which will result in decreased liquidity, something the CFC does not want.
3) A better option would be to invest the following amounts in U.S. property:
1994 1995 1996 1997
$160 $200 $250 $0
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income without being subject to the interest charge regime when ac-
tual distributions are made.
While the overlap of the various anti-deferral regimes may help
preserve the tax base by discouraging foreign investment, it also cre-
ates a tremendous amount of complexity without any corresponding
advancement of the other international tax goals.
C. The Foreign Tax Credit
Income earned abroad by U.S. citizens or residents is usually
taxed by both the United States and the country in which it is
earned.10 9 Without some type of crediting system, the tax liability im-
posed by both countries could easily exceed the income upon which
the tax was levied.110 The foreign tax credit mechanism was developed
to prevent such double taxation."'
Two principles guide the formation and operation of the U.S. for-
eign tax credit.112 First, foreign taxes paid by U.S. shareholders should
not reduce the tax burden those corporations would have incurred
had such income been earned in the United States." 3 Second, foreign
taxes paid on one type of income should not reduce U.S. taxes on
another type of income." 4 Both principles support Efficiency by en-
suring that the tax imposed on each type of foreign income will not be
less than the tax imposed by the United States on domestic income."'
At its most basic level, the foreign tax credit provides a one dollar
reduction in a U.S. shareholder's tax liability for each dollar of foreign
Each of these investments will be considered a "distribution" for purposes of the PFIC
regime. The effect is that when the $250 dividend is distributed in 1991, it will not be considered
an "excess distribution" and will therefore not be subject to the interest charge method. The
advantage of the third option is that the CFC's shareholders still get the benefits of partial defer-
ral (i.e.- $140 is deferred in 1994), the eventual distribution of cash will not be subject to the
interest charge regime, and yet the subsidiary does not have to make a series of cash distribu-
tions when it cannot afford to do so. The only downside to this is that the parent will have to pay
tax on the triggered Subpart F inclusions when they are made.
109 Richard M. Hammer & Wesley N. Riemer, Coping With Separate Foreign Tax Credit Limi-
tations, 1 L IN 'L TAX'N. 5 (1990).
110 Roin, supra note 3, at 923.
Ill Roin, supra note 3, at 925-27.
112 Charles I. Kingson, The Foreign Tax Credit and its Critics, 9 AM. J. TAX POL'Y. 1, 2 (1991).
113 Id. at 2.
114 Id. at 2.
115 Id. at 3. The foreign tax credit mechanism eliminates the incentive, which is present under
an exemption system, for U.S. MNCs to invest in low tax jurisdictions. Under a credit system, a
corporation will always pay tax at least at the U.S. rates. On the other hand, an exemption
system works by simply exempting foreign source income from a company's gross income. The
exemption system provides an incentive to invest in lower tax jurisdictions because corporations
operating there pay a lower absolute tax liability. Roin, supra note 3, at 924-25.
Anti-Deferral Deferred
16:248 (1995)
taxes paid. 1 6 Therefore, if a U.S. shareholder has a U.S. tax liability
of $100 and pays $40 of foreign taxes, the U.S. tax liability should be
reduced to $60.
If the foreign tax credit were this simple, however, the United
States Treasury would end up subsidizing those countries which tax at
higher rates." 7 To prevent this "subsidization dilemma" from eroding
U.S. tax receipts, the Code contains two foreign tax credit limita-
tions."8 Each limitation furthers one of the two aforementioned prin-
ciples which guide the foreign tax credit.
The first principle, that foreign taxes paid by U.S. owned foreign
corporations should in no way reduce the tax burden those corpora-
tions would have incurred had such income been earned in the United
States, is furthered by the overall limitation. This limitation works by
allowing a credit for foreign taxes equal to what the taxes would have
been on the income had it been earned in the United States. 119 There-
fore, if a foreign subsidiary earns $1,000 and pays foreign taxes of
$500, the credit is limited to what the U.S. tax would be on $1,000, or
$340.120
However, the overall limitation can be circumvented if the U.S.
shareholder is allowed to own other foreign corporations which gener-
ate low-tax foreign source income in order to use up the excess credits
generated from their operations in high tax countries, and thereby vio-
late the second principle guiding the foreign tax credit, that foreign
taxes on one type of income should not reduce U.S. taxes on other
types of income.' 2' This principle is advanced through the use of the
116 "The basic mechanism is quite simple: Taxpayers generate one dollar of tax credit for each
dollar of foreign income tax they pay or accrue during the course of a year." Roin, supra note 3,
at 926.
117 For example, assume a domestic corporation generated $2,000 of domestic income, incur-
ring $680 of U.S. tax, and $1,000 of income earned abroad, incurring $680 of foreign tax. If there
were no limit on the amount of the foreign tax credit, the U.S. would receive absolutely no
income tax revenue, and the foreign government would receive $680. Effectively, the United
States would be subsidizing the ability of foreign countries to tax at rates higher than our own!
118 I.R.C. § 904.
119 I.R.C. § 904(a).
120 Assuming an average tax rate of 34%.
121 Richard M. Hammer & Wesley N. Riemer, Coping With Separate Foreign Tax Credit Limi-
tations, 1 J. INT'L TAxN'. 5 (1990). For example, assume that P, a domestic MNC, owns 100% of
S1, an active manufacturing enterprise in Germany. Further assume that S1 earns $200 of
income and incurs $100 of German income taxes. P will only be allowed a $68 credit for the
foreign taxes paid by S1, because § 904 limits the foreign tax credit to what the tax would be if it
were earned in the United States. Therefore the tax credit limit would be 34% of $200 or $68.
This leaves P in a $32 "excess credit position." However, P can utilize that extra $32 of
excess credits by generating low tax income. For example, assume P also owns S2, an investment
company located in a tax haven country. Further assume that S2 generates $100 of income and
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separate limitation categories. 122 Since the main purpose of the sepa-
rate limitations is to prevent corporations from offsetting high and low
taxed income, the categories typically target income which is 1) easily
moved from one jurisdiction to another; 2) bears little foreign tax; or
3) bears abnormally high rates of foreign tax.123
The separate limitations operate by categorizing income into vari-
ous baskets. 24 Each basket then has its own foreign tax credit limita-
tion. 25 As a result, it is more difficult for corporations to offset low
taxed income of one type against higher taxed income of another
type.126 However, because there can be high and low taxed income
within each basket, the offsetting problem can occur within each bas-
ket. This potential for abuse caused Congress to create something
called the "high tax kick-out," which takes passive income out of the
passive income basket if it is subject to high tax rates. 27 As a result
the corporation cannot derive the offsetting benefits referred to
above.128
no foreign tax liability. Now, P will have 300$ of foreign income, with a foreign tax credit limita-
tion of $102 and only $100 of foreign tax liability. The excess credit has been soaked up by the
income generated in the tax haven country. Richard D. Teigan, International Taxation: A Guide
For U.S. Corporations, 18 WM. MrrcHELL L. REv. 291, 318-319 (1992).
122 Richard D. Teigan, International Taxation A Guide For U.S. Corporations, 18 WM. MrrcH-
ELL L. REv. 291, 318-319 (1992).
123 Raymond Turner, Foreign Taxation Highlights of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 21 Irr'L_
LAW. 487 (1987).
124 These baskets are listed in I.R.C. § 904(d)(1)(A)-(I).
125 I.R.C. § 904(d) states that the Foreign Tax Credit limitation in § 904(a) applies separately
to each item of income outlined in § 904(d)(1)(A)-(I).
126 Refer to the previous example where P, a domestic MNC, owns 100% of S1, an active
manufacturing enterprise in Germany. Recall that S1 earned $200 of income and incurred $100
of German income taxes. P then used S2, which generated $100 of tax free income to use up the
excess credits he had from Sl's activities. Teigan, supra note 121, at 318-319. Congress has
prevented this maneuver by creating a separate basket for passive income. § 904(d)(1)(A).
Therefore, in the above example, the foreign tax credit limitation would be computed separately
for the $200 of active German income and for the $100 of tax free income. The result is that P is
only allowed to credit $68 of foreign taxes against his U.S. tax liability. The limit on the $200 of
German income is 34% of $200 or $68. The limit on the tax free income is 34% of $100 or $34
but there are no taxes on this income so the tax credits are useless. The effect of the separate
limitation categories is to reduce the allowable foreign tax credits by $34. ($102 computed with-
out separate baskets - $68 computed with separate limitation baskets).
127 I.R.C. § 904(d)(2)(A)(iii)(III) takes "high taxed income" out of the passive income limita-
tion basket and places it in the general income basket. Passive income is "high taxed" if the
foreign income taxes paid on such income exceeds the highest rate specified in § 11 (which is
currently 35%). I.R.C. § 904(d)(2)(F).
128 For example, assume that domestic corporation P owns S, a controlled foreign corporation
which has $100 of passive income subject to a 10% tax rate and $100 of passive income subject to
a 50% tax rate. Without the high tax kickout, the $200 of passive income would go into the
passive income basket provided for in § 904(d)(1)(A), which would result in a $68 basket limita-




However, one will never fully eliminate this "offsetting" problem
unless one creates a separate basket for every single transaction that a
foreign corporation engages in.12 9 Although Congress has not yet
taken this extreme position, it has done something similar with its cre-
ation of a separate basket for non-controlled foreign corporations. 30
This is a separate basket for U.S. MNCs which own at least 10%131 but
less than 50%132 of a foreign corporation ("10-50 companies").
The foreign tax credit mechanism furthers four international tax
goals. By allowing any credit at all, the Code decreases the chances for
double taxation and so furthers the goals of Competitiveness, Com-
patibility, and Efficiency.133 By imposing a cap on the credit, the Code
preserves the tax base by eliminating the tax incentive for operating in
high tax jurisdictions. However, the cap also thwarts both Efficiency
and Competitiveness by forcing some U.S. companies to pay more in
taxes because they operate abroad.'31 Moreover, as illustrated above,
tax kickout removes the $100 which is subject to the 50% tax rate from the passive basket and
places it into the general limitation basket. § 904(d)(2)(A)(iii)(III).This is because the 50% rate
exceeds the maximum rates for corporations outlined in § 11. As a result, two limitations will be
computed. The passive income basket win have a $34 overall limitation. (Assuming a 34% aver-
age U.S. tax rate). The entire $10 of tax generated on the low taxed passive income in the passive
income basket will be allowed as a credit. However, only $34 of the foreign taxes paid on the
passive income in the general limitation basket will be creditable against U.S. taxes. $16 will be
unsheltered by the foreign tax credit.
129 This is often what is referred to as the "transactional approach" to the foreign tax credit.
Charles I. Kingson, The Foreign Tax Credit and its Critics, 9 AM. J. TAX PoL'Y. 1, 17 (1991).
130 I.R.C. § 904(d)(1)(E) establishes a separate limitation category for dividends from a non
controlled § 902 corporation.
131 A parent corporation must own at least 10% of its foreign subsidiary in order to be eligi-
ble for a foreign tax credit under § 902(a).
132 A controlled foreign corporation is a corporation in which over 50% of the vote or value
of the corporation is owned by U.S. shareholders. I.R.C. § 957(a). Congress passed the separate
basket for 10-50 companies because it was afraid that U.S. MNCs were acquiring foreign opera-
tions solely for the ability to utilize their foreign tax credits. However, the idea that U.S. corpo-
rations would make such a significant investment overseas without a legitimate business reason
is somewhat difficult to believe. Richard M. Hammer & Wesley N. Riemer, Coping With Sepa-
rate Foreign Tax Credit Limitations, 1 J. IN-'L. TAX'N. 5 (1990).
133 "[B]y removing what would otherwise represent a significant disincentive for foreign in-
vestment, the foreign tax credit promotes both efficiency and competitiveness. "Alan Wilensky,
International Tax Reform: An Interim Report, 93 TAX NoTEs INTr' 15-12 (Jan. 15, 1993). More-
over, since the foreign tax credit helps prevent double taxation, it furthers the goal of compatibil-
ity with international tax norms.
134 Id. "The foreign tax credit limitation can be considered to detract from economic effi-
ciency because the inability to credit excess foreign taxes against U.S. tax on U.S. source income
can result in a greater overall tax burden for foreign than for domestic investment.... Restric-
tions on cross-crediting are often considered to impair competitiveness by subjecting U.S. inves-
tors to a greater overall tax burden than their foreign competitors...."
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in order to make the various caps work, so many complex rules are
needed that Simplicity is completely abandoned.'35
III. THE PROPOSED PASSIvE FOREIGN COMPANY REGIME
It has often been said that "Congress legislates in haste and re-
pents at leisure, if ever."' 36 This is especially true in the area of inter-
national taxation. Ever since the first anti-deferral regime was
implemented, the area of international taxation has only become
more convoluted. Yet, it was not until 1990 that Dan Rostenkowski,
then Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, called for a
simplification of the Code which included reformation of the several
anti-deferral regimes.137 Congressman Rostenkowski laid out six goals
which would be necessary for any simplification measure. The bill
would have to:
" Reduce record keeping
" Reduce compliance costs
" Not create opportunities for abusive tax planning
" Create benefits from simplification which would outweigh the costs
resulting from changing the Code
" Not result in a shift of the tax burden among taxpayers
" Comport with current budget constraints
38
In response, Congress developed the Passive Foreign Corporation
(PFC) regime. 39 This anti-deferral regime has itself been deferred in
that it, in varied forms, has been up for consideration by Congress
three times but has not yet been passed.140 The purpose of this part is
135 A Treasury Report discussing international tax policy, released in January, 1993, stated,
"The application of multiple separate limitations, however, has made the foreign tax credit pro-
visions the clearest example of excessive complexity in the international rules." Id.
136 James S. Eustice, Tax Complexity and the Tax Practitioner, 45 TAX L. REv. 7, 14 (1989).
137 137 CONG. REC. H5232 (1991).
138 Id.
139 The House report accompanying the bill describes some of the current problems: "Some
regimes preserve the character of the income earned in the hands of a foreign corporation while
others do not. Some provide for movement of losses between years of a single foreign corpora-
tion or between multiple corporations while others do not. While a consistent theme of these
regimes is to provide current taxation for certain types of interest, dividend, rental, royalty, and
other similar income, the different regimes apply different criteria to these items of income to
determine their current inclusion or non inclusion.... consolidation of the operating rules per-
mits more uniform extension of those benefits to all taxpayers subject to the current inclusion
regime." H.R. Rep. No. 103-353.
140 The PFC legislation was included in H.R. 11 in 1991, which eventually was vetoed by
President Bush. It was resurrected again in very similar format again the next year in H.R. 4210.
This legislation was also vetoed by President Bush. In 1993 the House Ways and Means commit-
tee made certain minor modifications to the PFC legislation and referred it to the Senate for
further consideration. The Senate chose not to act on the legislation and it is no longer pending.
Many people have speculated why the legislation was not passed in the Senate. One possible
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to describe the PFC regime and examine whether it interacts with in-
ternational tax goals better than its predecessors.
The PFC regime is really a composite of three mechanisms which
determine the amount of a foreign corporation's income which will be
subject to current taxation.141 The regime would repeal the FPHC and
PFIC regimes and would exempt foreign corporations from the AET
and PHC regimes.142 However, the regime would retain and work in
tandem with Subpart F.
A. Operation of PFC Regime
A foreign corporation is a passive foreign corporation, or PFC, if:
1) sixty percent or more of its gross income is passive income, or 2)
fifty percent or more of its assets (on average during the year mea-
sured by value) produce passive income or are held for the purpose of
producing passive income, or 3) the company is registered under the
Investment Company Act of 1940 as a management company or a unit
investment trust.143 The PFC regime ends deferral through three dif-
ferent mechanisms: 1) current inclusion, 2) mark-to-market or 3) in-
terest charge. 144
1. Current Inclusion
If a PFC is U.S. controlled, 4 ' then all of the PFC's shareholders
must use this method of income inclusion. 146 A shareholder must also
use this method if he or she owns twenty-five percent or more of a
non-U.S. controlled PG.147 However, even if shareholders are not re-
explanation is that the Senate Finance committee was also at work on health care legislation that
year. Another explanation is that the PFC regime, standing alone, was a revenue loser. To make
up for the lost revenues, the bill was going to impose a UBIT, or Unrelated Business Income
Tax, on not-for-profit corporations which received dividends from foreign companies. Both these
explanations were confirmed in a telephone interview between the author and a Democratic
House Ways and Means Committee Aide. However, tax analysts cited additional reasons. For
example, one commentator remarked that since the PFC regime retained three income inclusion
methods, it would not be much easier to apply than the current series of regimes. John Turro,
Bill Could Force Exempts to Pay UBIT on Foreign Dividends., 63 TAX NoTES 1085 (May 30,
1994). Other commentators note that since the PFC retains the asset test, many people feel that
the PFC, much like the PFIC regime, sweeps far too broadly. Foreign Simplification Bills Seen
Getting Weak Support, 233 DAILY TAX REP. 6, 8 (1991).
141 See H.R. Rep. No. 353, at 103-112.
142 H.R. 3419, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 401 (a-b) (1993).
143 H.R. Rep. No. 353, at 101.
144 H.R. Rep. No. 353, at 103-112.
145 "U.S. controlled" has the same meaning under Subpart F and the Foreign Personal Hold-
ing Company Regime. See H.R. Rep. No. 353, at 104.
146 Id. at 103.
147 Id.
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quired to use this method of income inclusion they may still elect it if
they wish.' 48 This method is very similar to the QEF election currently
available to shareholders in a PFIC. This method requires that the
shareholder currently include 100% of the PFC's income in his or her
income.149 The current inclusion mechanism accomplishes this by first
deeming the subsidiary to be a CFC if it is not already a CFC.150 It
then labels all of a PFC's income as Foreign Base Company Income (a
component of Subpart F income), which is then imputed to the share-
holders of the "deemed CFC" through the regular § 951(a)(1)(A)
Subpart F rules.' 5' Any actual PFC distribution will be treated as a
distribution of previously taxed income and will not be taxed again.'5 2
2. Mark-to-Market
If a PFC shareholder owns less than twenty-five percent of the
corporation, and the corporation is not U.S. controlled, then he or she
may use the mark-to-market method of income inclusion. 153 This
method requires the shareholder to annually mark his or her shares to
market and recognize as income any excess of the fair market value of
his or her PFC stock over its adjusted basis.'5 4 Unlike the current in-
clusion mechanism, this mechanism does not flow through the Subpart
F rules and simply imputes the income to the shareholder itself.15 5
If the adjusted basis of the stock exceeds its fair market value
then the taxpayer is allowed a deduction. 5 6 However, this deduction
is limited to the "unreversed inclusions" of the PFC stock.'57 Unre-
versed inclusions are defined as the total excess of prior gains over
148 Id. at 105.
149 Id. at 101.
150 Under the PFC regime this would be the new I.R.C. § 1292(a)(1)(A)(iii); H.R. 3419,
§ 402.
151 This has been the operation of the bill in its 1992 and 1993 versions. However, it should be
noted that the 1991 version labeled the income FPHC income, rather than foreign base company
income. H.R. 2777, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 301 (1991).
152 H.R. 2777, § 311.
153 This is assuming that they did not make the current inclusion election. H.R. Rep. No. 353,
at 105.
154 The character of this income is ordinary income. H.R. Rep. No. 353, at 106.
155 H.R. 3419, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
156 H.R. Rep No. 353, at 106.
157 Id. For example, if the fair market value of a PFC, with an adjusted basis of $50, was as
follows:
1995 1996 1997 1998
60 62 63 48
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prior losses recognized for the PFC stock.158 The effect of this limita-
tion is to prevent the shareholder from ever recognizing an overall
loss on the stock.
3. Interest Charge Method
The mark-to-market method is only a viable alternative if the
PFC's stock is "marketable.' 1 59 Therefore, shareholders who are not
forced to use, or do not elect to use, the current inclusion method, are
forced to use the interest charge method if their PFC shares are not
marketable. 60 This interest charge method operates basically the
same as the PFIC interest charge method.
B. What does the PFC Regime solve?
1. Complexity
The main benefit of the PFC regime is that it decreases the sheer
number of regimes that the tax planner must deal with from six to
two. Therefore, in this respect, the PFC regime advances the goal of
Simplicity.161
the shareholder would recognize the following income inclusions under the mark to market
method:
1995 1996 1997 1998
10 2 1 (13)
The full $15 of loss is not allowed as a deduction in 1998 because of the "unreversed inclusion"
limitation.
158 Id.
159 Marketable stock is stock which is regularly traded on a "qualified exchange" either inside
or outside the United States. A qualified exchange is any exchange: 1) registered with the SEC;
2) registered with the national market system; 3) the secretary of the Treasury believes ensures
market prices which represent a legitimate and sound price for the stock; or 4) any PFC stock
held by an RIC that continuously offers for sale or has outstanding any stock (of which it is the
issuer) which is redeemable at its net asset value. H.R. Rep. No. 353, at 106-107.
160 H.R. Rep. No. 353, at 110.
161 However, some analysts have argued that the PFC regime will not have a large impact on
complexity, because it still contains three income inclusion methods and the transition rules be-
tween these three methods are going to require extremely tedious regulations from the Treasury
Department. Jessee R. Rubin, Simplifying Taxes on Offshore Investment Co. Shareholders. 52
TAX NoTs 1299, 1305 (1991). Yet, this criticism is probably without merit. The transition rules
between the current inclusion and mark-to-market methods should not be very complicated
since they both subject income of the PFC to current taxation and raise the basis of the stock in
the hands of the shareholder accordingly. The mark-to-market method increases the basis in
§ 1291 of the proposed legislation. H.R. Rep. No. 3419,103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The current
inclusion mechanism increases the basis because it imputes the PFC's income to the shareholder
through the Subpart F rules, which increase the stock's basis through § 961.
Since the amount included in income every year under the two methods may be different,
the basis adjustments are necessarily going to be different under the two methods. Yet, it is
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2. RICs
Another benefit of the PFC regime is that it allows for one level
of taxation for RICs by treating any PFC stock held by an RIC, as
marketable. 162 The RIC then includes the income of the PFC based on
the mark-to-market method just as if it was a dividend from any other
corporation. Therefore, as long as the RIC distributes ninety percent
of its investment income, it will only be taxed once!163 This helps to
preserve the tax base by eliminating the dual tax imposed on RICs by
the interest charge method of the PFIC regime.
3. Mark-To-Market
It is often difficult for minority shareholders to provide the infor-
mation required by I.R.C. § 1295 in making a QEF election, but they
do not want to be subject to the interest charge method either, for the
reasons discussed in Part II(A)(6). The mark-to-market method offers
a good compromise to those shareholders who do not have the power
difficult to see why that alone necessitates a complex series of transition rules. The basis under
the mark-to-market method could be the beginning basis under the current inclusion method
and vice-versa. Therefore, no transition rules would really be necessary at least between these
two methods. Although this may mean that shareholders in the same PFC may realize different
amounts of income over time, such a disparity is inherent with any regime which has multiple
income inclusion methods.
Moreover, any rules needed to govern the transition between either the mark-to-market or
current inclusion and the interest charge method would not be any more difficult than what is
currently in place under the PFIC regime to govern the transition between the interest charge
method and the QEF election. Therefore, the criticism that the PFC regime does not eliminate
complexity because certain transition rules will be required is probably unfounded.
162 H.R. 3419, § 402(a).
163 The Joint Committee on Taxation confirmed that the bill will treat all the stock in a PFC,
which is held by an RIC, as marketable stock. The committee also confirmed that any income
inclusion under the mark-to-market regime would count towards the 90% dividends received
deduction under § 851(b)(2). Joint Committee on Taxation, JCT Issues Revised Report on Sim-
plification, 92 TAX NoTEs TODAY 50-18, (1992). Therefore, the RIC can avoid paying the cor-
porate level tax on PFC income the same way they eliminate the corporate level tax on income
from domestic stocks. They simply have to distribute 90% of the income. One criticism of this
approach is that basically, the legislation forces an RIC to distribute 90% of an amount which it
may not have! The amount of income an RIC realizes currently does not have to bear ANY
relationship to the amount of dividends actually distributed by the PFC. So, if the market value
of the RIC's PFC stock increases by $100, the RIC will be required to distribute $90 in order to
avoid the corporate level tax. § 851(b)(2). However, the RIC may have not received any cash
from the PFC at all. Therefore, this legislation requires the RIC to distribute 90% of the PFC's
income to its shareholders, even though the RIC may not have any cash with which to make such
a distribution!
However, in defense of the PFC regime, it would seem that this liquidity problem would be
inherent in any abandonment of the classical tax system. Moreover, this modification is defi-
nitely an improvement over the two levels of tax which are imposed under the interest charge




to get the information required for the QEF election, but still wish to
avoid the interest charge method. This mark-to-market method alter-
native also advances the goal of Simplicity because it is fairly easy to
apply.
4. High Tax Exception
One specific problem the PFC solves is the anomaly alluded to
previously where a company which is both a FPHC and a CFC is de-
nied the high tax exception allowed for companies which are only
CFCs. The PFC regime eliminates this anomaly by eliminating the
FPHC provisions. 164
C. What does PFC miss?
1. Income Allocation
Since the interest charge method of the PFC regime is almost
identical to the interest charge method employed under the PFIC re-
gime, all the same problems arise. For example, by failing to tie in-
come allocations to those years when income is actually earned, the
PFC penalizes corporations which are not really deferring income, just
like the PFIC regime.
2. Overlap Advantage
Under the PFIC regime, distributions under § 956 and § 956A are
considered "actual distributions" for purposes of the interest charge
method, but regular Subpart F inclusions are not.1 65 It was demon-
strated earlier in this paper how this can lead to partial deferral. This
is still the case under the latest version of the PFC regime.1 66 It would
be more logical for the PFC regime to either qualify all Subpart F
inclusions as "actual distributions" or disqualify all of them. By not
solving this problem, the PFC regime advances Competitiveness, be-
cause the foreign corporation might be able to achieve partial defer-
ral. Yet that necessarily means that the goal of Preservation is
sacrificed because U.S. citizens have more of an incentive to invest
abroad.
164 This is described in what would be the new I.R.C. § 1292(a)(1)(B). H.R. Rep. No. 3419,
§ 402.
165 I.R.C. § 1297(b)(9).
166 § 1297(d)(6) of the 1993 version of the PFC regime is similar to the language which is
currently in I.R.C. § 1297(b)(9). H.R. Rep. No. 3419, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 16:248 (1995)
3. Installment Sales
The 1991 and 1992 versions of the PFC legislation contained pro-
visions which denied installment sales treatment to the sale of PFC
stock which was subject to the interest charge method.167 The pur-
pose of this was to prevent a sale, which would be considered an ex-
cess distribution, from escaping the interest charge method by simply
spreading the payments over a period longer than a year. The 1993
version of the PFC rules do NOT deny installment sales treatment to
sales of PFC stock, even though it would seem prudent to have such a
provision in the regime.
4. Income Characterization
While the character of the PFC's income, ordinary income or cap-
ital gain, is passed through to the shareholder under the current inclu-
sion method, all of the income of the PFC is treated as ordinary under
the mark-to-market method. 168 The current inclusion method furthers
Efficiency, because domestic entities with pass-through tax treatment,
like partnerships, pass through the character of their income to their
shareholders. Conversely, the mark-to-market method thwarts Effi-
ciency by not passing through the character of the gain.
IV. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNATIONAL
TAX REFORM
Thus far, this comment has demonstrated that the current inter-
national tax system both furthers and sacrifices each of the five inter-
national tax goals outlined at the beginning of this paper. The PFC
reform proposal falls into the same trap. Since there is no overarching
goal against which to measure success, neither the current system nor
the proposed PFC system can really be said to be better. Therefore,
this part will attempt to identify a primary goal for the United States'
system of international taxation against which the success of a particu-
lar regime may be measured.
On January 25, 1993, the U.S. Treasury issued a preliminary re-
port outlining the options the United States had for reform in the area
of international taxation.169 After describing the five goals which have
been discussed throughout this paper, the report states that the goals
of Efficiency and Competitiveness are incompatible and cannot be ad-
167 § 302(b) of H.R. Rep. No. 2777, § 302(b).
168 § 1291; § 1292;§ 1293 or the proposed legislation. H.R. Rep. No. 3419, § 402.
169 Wilensky, supra note 133, at id.
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vanced through the same tax regime.170 To that end, the report out-
lines the principles a regime for each goal.
The problem with the Treasury Report is that it ends without de-
veloping any analytical framework for choosing which goal should be
advanced.' 7' Instead the report starts with two incompatible goals and
then is forced to develop a regime for each of these goals.
This article suggests that the analytical framework consist of a
two step process. First, complementary and noncomplementary sets of
goals should be identified. Second, from the largest complementary
set, the goal which provides the most guidance for the development of
a tax regime should be chosen as the primary goal.
Complementary and noncomplementary sets should be deter-
mined. Complementary sets consist of two or more goals which may
be advanced simultaneously. Noncomplementary sets consist of two
or more goals, where the advancement of one goal necessarily means
that the other is thwarted.
Preservation and Competitiveness form a noncomplementary set,
because the advancement of one automatically means the other is sac-
rificed. Competitiveness requires that U.S. owned foreign corpora-
tions be taxed at the same rate as their foreign competitors. This
means that U.S. owned foreign corporations operating in tax haven
countries may not pay any U.S. income tax. However, this would cre-
ate a massive incentive to liquidate U.S. investments and invest
abroad, which would sacrifice Preservation.
Similarly, Competitiveness and Efficiency form a noncomple-
mentary set, because Competitiveness requires that U.S. owned for-
eign corporations operate without a tax disadvantage. As long as the
foreign jurisdiction is a high tax jurisdiction, both goals can be satis-
fied. However, in the event that a U.S. owned foreign corporation is
located in a tax haven, Competitiveness requires no additional U.S.
taxes be imposed, whereas Efficiency requires the imposition of U.S.
taxes to eliminate the disparity between the taxes imposed by the tax
haven and the taxes imposed by the United States.
Lastly, Preservation forms a noncomplementary set with Com-
patibility. Compatibility mandates the elimination of discrimination
whereas Preservation fosters it by imposing additional U.S. taxes only
upon those U.S. owned foreign corporations which choose to operate
170 Wilensky, supra note 133, at id.
171 Wilensky, supra note 133, at id.
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in lower taxing jurisdictions. 72 However, since there is no correspond-
ing reduction of tax liabilities for corporations operating in high tax
jurisdictions, Preservation discriminates solely against low tax jurisdic-
tions and therefore necessarily violates international tax norms.
Every other goal is potentially complementary to the other goals.
As a result, the largest complementary set would be one which ex-
cludes Competitiveness and Preservation. By elimination, this set
would include the goals of: Efficiency, Compatibility, and Simplicity.
The second stage in the analytical framework is to choose from
this complementary set the primary goal which provides the most gui-
dance for the development of a tax regime. Simplicity can be elimi-
nated out of hand because it is devoid of analytic content and provides
no basis for the creation of a regime. Compatibility similarly adds very
little direction to this analysis. Since there is more than one interna-
tional tax norm, choosing Compatibility as the primary goal would
simply exacerbate the current problem. Efficency provides much more
guidance.
Choosing Efficiency as a primary goal is problematic, however.
Efficiency requires the complete elimination of tax concerns as a com-
ponent of investment decisions. However, in the absence of global in-
tegration of tax systems and rates, such neutrality may be a practical
impossibility. One international tax expert, Julie Roin, has suggested
that in order to attain "absolute neutrality," or the total elimination of
tax considerations as a component of investment decisions, the U.S.
would have to subsidize, through the use of an unlimited foreign tax
credit, those U.S. companies which desired to invest in foreign coun-
tries with higher rates of tax than our own. 173 This is the "subsidiza-
tion dilemma," referred to above, which would effectively turn the
United States system of international taxation into a welfare program
for some of the wealthiest industrialized nations on earth.
This is why Roin outlines the concept of "defensive neutrality."
This form of neutrality is defined such that the U.S. tax liability of
U.S. owned foreign corporations must equal or exceed the tax liability
which would be incurred had those subsidiaries been located in the
172 Although Efficiency also seeks the imposition of additional taxes on U.S. owned corpora-
tions operating in tax havens, it also seeks to reduce the tax liability of those corporations which
operate in high tax jurisdictions. Therefore, whereas Efficiency seeks to impose the same tax rate
on any U.S. owned corporation located in any country, Preservation only concerns itself with
imposing U.S. rates on low tax jurisdictions. As a result, Preservation could be said to discrimi-
nate whereas Efficiency does not.
173 Roin, supra note 3, at 926-30.
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United States. 74 The problem is that defense neutrality does not pro-
mote Efficiency, because investors are discouraged from investing in
those jurisdictions which tax at higher rates than the United States. As
a result, the United States may be confronted with the option of abso-
lute neutrality and the subsidization dilemma or abandoning Effi-
ciency as its primary goal.
V. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE NEW REGIME
If Efficiency is the goal to be advanced through the international
tax system, a new regime must be developed which equalizes the tax
effects of foreign and domestic investments. The principles of the re-
gime would be as follows:
" The first step in such a system would be the complete elimination of
deferral. U.S. owned foreign corporations could not be allowed to de-
fer the incidence of U.S. taxation because the existence of tax haven
countries means that those corporations could lower the present value
of their overall tax liability vis-a-vis domestic corporations.
" This would necessarily also lead to the elimination of deferral for do-
mestic corporations, so that investment in those corporations would
not be favored.
" The foreign tax credit limits would have to be repealed in order to
eliminate the disincentive to invest in high tax jurisdictions.
Such a regime could be developed by simply modifying the proposed
PFC regime such that it would apply to all U.S. citizens and residents
owning any amount of stock in any domestic or foreign corporation.
This change would lead to a series of complex ramifications,
which must be sorted through. However, some issues would not be as
problematic as they first appear to be. For example, the dramatic in-
crease in the present value of shareholder tax liability could be offset
by an elimination of the classical tax system and its corporate level
income tax. Moreover, although the subsidization dilemma is a vexing
problem, it would be mitigated to some extent because the elimination
in the corporate level income tax would necessitate a corresponding
increase in the individual marginal tax rates in order to make up the
revenue shortfall.
If the U.S. utilized this regime, it would not necessarily collect
more taxes than foreign countries which adhered to the current classi-
cal tax system. Rather, it would collect the same amount of tax,
sooner, at one level, than foreign countries, adhering to the classical
system, would collect in two stages utilizing two levels of taxation.
174 Roin, supra note 3, at 926-30.
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This regime would further Efficiency by subjecting all corporate
investments, domestic and foreign, to the same system of taxation. If a
U.S. shareholder invests in a low tax jurisdiction, he will have to pay
the difference between the U.S. taxes which would have been imposed
on that income and the foreign taxes which were paid. If a U.S. share-
holder invests in a jurisdiction imposing higher rates of tax than the
U.S., then that shareholder will be able to offset those foreign taxes
without limit against her U.S. tax liability. However, because U.S.
rates will have to be adjusted upward to compensate for the loss of
revenue attribuitable to the corporate level tax, this may be a rare
occurrence.
Moreover, the other international goals can still be furthered.
Since Efficiency is complementary to the goals of Compatibility and
Simplicity, those two goals will be advanced simultaneously with Effi-
ciency through the new regime.
Preservation would also be enhanced since the focus of the new
income tax regime would be on individuals instead of corporations.
Whereas a U.S. citizen currently can defer the U.S. corporate level tax
simply by investing outside the country, under the new regime the tax-
payer would actually have to "expatriate." That is he would have to
renounce his U.S. citizenship and leave the country in order to achieve
deferral. Although this may become a problem if more Americans
find the choice to expatriate a palatable one,17 there are numerous
factors completely unrelated to the income tax which can be em-
ployed to dissuade U.S. citizens from expatriating. 76
Although this regime would not advance the goal of Competitive-
ness as it has traditionally been defined in relation to the Code, it
would help corporations to be competitive in the international mar-
ketplace in a broader economic sense. By making individuals the sole
incidence of taxation, the Code would be more efficient and would
free businesses and shareholders to make numerous decisions without
as much emphasis placed on tax consequences. 177 Probably the most
175 It should be noted that 306 Americans did in fact expatriate in 1993. Michael Kinsely,
Love it or Leave It, TIME, Nov. 28, 1994, at 96.
176 As a recent article on the expatriation of wealthy Americans pointed out, the United
States could never hope to retain any of its wealthy citizens if income tax rates were the only
criteria used in deciding whether or not to stay. Id.
177 "While it is difficult to quantify the cost of these distortions [caused by the classical double
tax system] to the U.S. economy, the Department of Treasury's 'Report on Integration of the
Individual and Corporate Tax Systems' has estimated that integration of the corporate and indi-
vidual tax system to eliminate one level of tax would, depending on the form of the integration
proposal, increase the capital stock in the corporate sector by $125 billion to $500 billion, de-
crease the debt-to-asset ratio in the corporate sector by one to seven percentage points, and
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important ramification, however, may be the possibility of structuring
the regime such that corporations would no longer have a tax prefer-
ence for debt financing as opposed to equity.178 This reduction in debt
with a corresponding decrease in debt service would also make corpo-
rations more competitive in the global marketplace.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this comment recommends that the United States
government develop a single regime similar to the one outlined above
in order to advance the goal of Efficiency. In the absence of such far
reaching reform, however, this comment would at the very least rec-
ommend that the United States government: 1) develop an analytical
framework through which it can determine which international tax
goal it primarily seeks to advance, and 2) advance that goal through a
single international tax regime.
produce an annual gain to the U.S. economy as a whole from $2.5 billion to $25 billion (in 1991
dollars). Also, a reduced incentive for debt would make capital structures less vulnerable to
instability during economic downturns." Doemberg, supra note 13, at 535-36.
178 Doemberg, supra note 13, at 537.
